

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP, MILL, PO

SUBJ: ASST SECRETARY HARTMAN'S LUNCHEON WITH SERVICE CHIEFS

SUMMARY: THE CHIEFS OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE MET WITH ASST SECY HARTMAN ON JAN 26, A TWO-HOUR WORKING LUNCHEON, HOSTED BY THE CHARGE AND ATTENDED BY DATT, ARMA AND ALUSNA. THEY DISCUSSED THEIR EQUIPMENT NEEDS, THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH REESTABLISHING VIABLE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, AND SOME ASPECTS OF THE POLITICAL SCENE. WHILE POINTING OUT THE NEED FOR CAUTION, THEY ALL SPOKE IN FAVOR OF AN INCREASED PORTUGUESE-NATO MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. EDN SUMMARY.

1. ARMY CHIEF, GEN ANTONIO RAMALHO EANES, MADE THESE POINTS:
-- THE ARMY'S PRINCIPAL REQUIREMENT IN TERMS OF ASSISTANCE IS AN AIR TRANSPORTABLE BRIGADE, WITH TRAINING FOR PERSONNEL AND MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING EQUIPMENT SPARES.

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-- MILITARY CONTACT WITH NATO MUST BE HANDLED IN A VERY DISCREET MANNER UNTIL THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTION, NOW SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 25, 1976.

-- THE ARMY'S PROBLEM IS AT THE SAME TIME MORE SIMPLE AND MORE COMPLEX THAN THE OTHER SERVICES. WHERE THE NAVY AND THE AIR FORCE HAVE "TRADING" MATERIAL THE ARMY HAS NONE. HOWEVER, THE TYPES OF EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FULFILL ARMY REQUIREMENTS ARE NEITHER AS EXPENSIVE NOR AS CRITICALLY SHORT AS ARE SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN THE HEAVY INFLOW OF CONSCRIPTS, THE ARMY IS MORE A REFLECTION OF SOCIETY THAN ARE THE OTHER SERVICES. THUS THE ARMY MUST GIVE MORE CONSIDERATION TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION OF ITS PERSONNEL. IN FACT, THE MENTALITY OF THE POPULATION

AS A WHOLE MUST BE CHANGED TO THE POINT WHERE THE PEOPLE UNDERSTAND PORTUGAL'S ROLE IN NATO. PEOPLE WILL HAVE TO LEARN GRADUALLY THAT PORTUGAL IS NOT BECOMING A CLIENT OF A MAJOR FOREIGN POWER AS IT ASSUMES A CLOSER MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO AND THE U.S. THIS WILL NATURALLY TAKE SOME TIME.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS BE COMPLETED WHICH WILL GIVE PORTUGAL SOMEHOPE FOR THE FUTURE WITHOUT LEAVING IT MORTGAGED TO A MAJOR POWER.

-- IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF ANY EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PORTUGAL WERE GIVEN ON THE BASIS OF COMPENSATION IN NATIONALLY PRODUCED GOODS AS OPPOSED TO GRANTS OR LOANS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WOULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE PORTUGUESE PEOPLE THAT THE ARMED FORCES RECEIPT OF EQUIPMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A DRAIN ON THE ECONOMY BUT RATHER A MEANS FOR OBTAINING AN OUTLET FOR NATIONALLY PRODUCED GOODS.

-- THE ARMY NEEDS A ROLE IN SOCIETY, IT MUST BE PERCEIVED AS HAVING A ROLE, AND IT MUST HAVE THE RESPECT OF THE PEOPLE. ONE WAY TO DO THIS IS TO INCLUDE PORTUGUESE OPERATIONAL UNITS IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES.

2. SUBSEQUENT TO THE LUNCHEON, CONVERSATION TURNED TO POLITICS. GEN EANES WAS OBVIOUSLY DEFERRED TO BY THE OTHER CHIEFS. HE SAID
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THAT THE AFM-PARTY PACT WAS NOT EXPECTED TO BE ACCEPTED IN ITS INITIAL FORM, BUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PACT WOULD RESULT FROM COMPROMISE. HE NOTED THAT THE PS HAD ALREADY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A COMPROMISE PLAN AND THAT THE PPD WOULD NOT BE FAR BEHIND. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE APPARENTLY ANTI-PACT STANCE OF THE PPD, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE PPD HAS A PUBLIC FACE FOR ITS CONSTITUENTS AND A PRIVATE FACE IN ITS DISCUSSION WITH THE MILITARY. HE ADDED THAT THE PARTIES, JUST AS THE MILITARY, REALLY HAVE THE

INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY AT HEART, AND AGREED WITH GEN MORAIS DA SILVA WHEN THE LATTER SAID THAT MODERATE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN FORCES HAD COME THROUGH TOO MUCH IN 1975 TO THROW AWAY THEIR VICTORY AT THIS POINT.

3. ALSO OF INTEREST WAS GEN EANES' INQUIRY OF THE CHARGE REGARDING RESULTS OF RECENT U.S.-SPANISH TALKS. EANES REMARKED ON THE IMPACT OF EVENTS IN SPAIN AS THEY AFFECT PORTUGAL, NOTING THAT THE RESOLUTION OF SPAIN'S RELATIONSHIP TO NATO IS IMPORTANT TO PORTUGAL.

4. ADMIRAL SOUTO CRUZ COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS:

-- HE OUTLINED THE PRESENT PROBLEMS OF POOR MATERIAL CONDITIONS AND INEXPERIENCE PERSONNEL UNTRAINED IN AVAL FUNCTIONS. THE PN LEFT 120 SHIPS (INCLUDING SMALL CRAFT) IN THE FORMER COLONIES, RETAINING ONLY ABOUT 40 OF THE LARGER SHIPS. A COMPLETE RESTRUCTURING AND REORGANIZATION OF THE PN IS UNDER STUDY. THEY INTEND TO USE PRESENT ASSETS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, BUT AID IS NECESSARY TO BECOME AN EFFECTIVE FORCE. EVEN THE BASIC MISSION OF THE NAVY MUST BE REDEFINED.

-- THE PN MUST RETAIN A NATO ROLE AND THE COUNTRY MUST STRENGTHEN ITS TIES WITH THE WEST. THE PRESENT NATO MISSION MAY HAVE TO BE REVISED TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE NEW PN STRUCTURE WHEN IT IS DEFINED.

-- AID IN TRAINING IS ESSENTIAL AND HE ENDORSED THE CONCEPT OF MOBILE TECHNICAL TEAMS PROVIDING TRAINING IN-COUNTRY. HE WOULD LIKE AS MUCH HARDWARE PROCUREMENT AS POSSIBLE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF THE VENDOR COUNTRY AGREEING TO PURCHASE AN EQUAL VALUE OF PORTUGUESE PRODUCTS (WINE, ETC.).

-- THE PN IS PLANNING ON SELLING THE THREE REMAINING

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CLASS SUBMARINES TO PAKISTAN. INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN THIS WEEK ON THE PROCUREMENT OF SMALL VICKERS PIRANA-CLASS SUBMARINES TO USE FOR ASW TRAINING. THIS NEGOTIATION WILL BE THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO DEAL ON THE BASIS OF PURCHASE OF PORTUGUESE PRODUCTS. THE PN HOPED TO PROCURE "TWO, THREE, OR FOUR" SUBMARINES, DEPENDING ON WHAT THEY CAN AFFORD.

-- SPEAKING AS "PRIVATE CITIZEN", HE SAID THAT THE PORTUGUESE PEOPLE HAVE A GREAT CONCERN OVER MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. THEY FEEL THAT THEY HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED AS A CHEAP LABOR MARKET. THE PULL-OUT OF SEVERAL COMPANIES WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE RAISING OF WAGES WAS PERCEIVED AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THIS, THOUGH HE

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PERSONALLY UNDERSTOOD THE OTHER REASONS -- FEAR OF EXPROPRIATION, ETC. THE TIMEX CUTBACK WAS DISCUSSED. WHEN IT WAS BROUGHT OUT THAT THE WORLD MARKET FOR SUCH PRODUCTS HAVE BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED BY THE LOW-PRICED ELECTRONIC WATCHES, HE STATED THAT THIS REASON SHOULD HAVE BEEN VIGOROUSLY PUBLICIZED RATHER THAN TIMEX LAYING OFF LARGE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL WITHOUT EXPLANATION.

5. DURING THE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICS, ADMIRAL SOUTO CRUZ STATED THAT STABILITY WOULD EBENTUALLY RETURN TO PORTUGAL, PRIMARILY THROUGH THE "HORSE-SENSE" OF THE PORTUGUESE PEOPLE. MANY POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARE BEING CAUSED BY OPPORTUNISTS RATHER THAN THOSE WITH POLITICAL CONVICTIONS.

6. WHEREAS THE OTHER TWO CHIEFS WERE SOMEWHAT FORMAL AND MEASURED IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS, GENERAL MORAIS DA SILVA WAS PERCEPTIBLY MORE RELAXED. HE MADE THESE POINTS:

-- HIS AIR FORCE, HE STATED FORTHRIGHTLY, WAS OPERATING WITH VIN-

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TAGE, POST WWII AND KOREAN WAR, AIRCRAFT. HE SAID THE PAF HAD ONLY TWO MODERN AIRCRAFT (B-707-C'S) TO TRADE OR SELL.

-- THE PRIMARY NEED FOR ASSISTANCE IS IN THE AREAS WHICH WILL PERMIT THE PAF TO PERFORM ITS NATO MISSION WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DEVELOPING AN INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITY. HE MENTIONED IN ORDER: C-130'S, A MODERN FIGHTER LIKE THE A-7 AND P-3S. WITH THE ATTENDANT TRAINING INVOLVED IN REEQUIPPING THE PAF WITH SUCH WEAPON SYSTEMS HE BELIEVED THAT THE PAF WOULD BECOME A PILOT PROGRAM LEADER IN UPGRADING SORELY NEEDED ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY IN RELATED INDUSTRIAL SECTORS.

-- DURING THE DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SECTORS, MORAIS WENT TO SOME LENGTHS TO EXPRESS HIS VIEW THAT PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES HAD BEEN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE IN BALANCING THE SCALES AGAINST EXTREMISTS IN BOTH THE LEFTIST AND RIGHTIST CAMPS DURING THE DIFFICULT PERIOD BETWEEN SEPT. 1974 AND NOV 19, 1975. HE NOTED THAT COSTA GOMES WAS A MASTER AT TIMING AND PERCEIVING THE POSSIBLE IN POLITICAL INTERACTIONS, AND IMPLIED THAT HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SCENE WOULD BE SORELY FELT. AS THE SERVICE CHIEF WITH MOST SENIORITY IN HIS PRESENT POSITION, MORAIS SAID THAT THE PREDECESSORS OF ADMIRAL CRUZ AND GENERAL EANES HAD OFTEN PREVENTED COSTA GOMES FROM TAKING ACTIONS THAT THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO TAKE.
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